We present a system of sequent calculus for intuitionistic propositional logic. In later chapters we obtain stronger systems by adding rules to this basic system, and we therefore go through its proof-theoretical properties in detail, in particular the admissibility of structural rules and the basic consequences of cut elimination. Many of these properties can then be verified in a routine fashion for extensions of the system. We begin with a discussion of the significance of constructive reasoning.
CONSTRUCTIVE REASONING
Intuitionistic logic, and intuitionism more generally, used to be philosophically motivated, but today the grounds for using intuitionistic logic can be completely neutral philosophically. Intuitionistic or constructive reasoning, which are the same thing, systematically supports computability: If the initial data in a problem or theorem are computable and if one reasons constructively, logic will never make one committed to an infinite computation. Classical logic, instead, does not make the distinction between the computable and the noncomputable. We illustrate these phenomena by an example:
A mathematical colleague comes with an algorithm for generating a decimal expansion O.aia 2 a 3 ..., and also gives a proof that if none of the decimals a t is greater than zero, a contradiction follows. Then you are asked to find the first decimal a k such that a k > 0. But you are out of luck in this task, for several hours and days of computation bring forth only 0's Given two real numbers a and b, if it happens to be true that they are equal, a and b would have to be computed to infinite precision to verify a = b. Obviously the truth of the proposition a = b is not continuous in its two arguments; to see this, think of a and b as points on the real line, assume that a = b is true, and then "move" one of the points just a bit. In a constructive approach, we start with the relation of apartness, or distinctness, of two real numbers, written as a ^ b. The principle is intuitively very clear if the points a, b, c are depicted geometrically, as points on the real line.
We now obtain equality as a defined notion:
Definition2.1.1: a = b = ~a^b.
Thus equality is a negative notion, and an infinitistic one also: To prove a = b, we have to show how to convert any of the infinitely many a priori possible proofs of a / b into an impossibility. From API we get at once
EQ1. a=a,
and from the contraposition of AP2
EQ2. a = c&b = cD a = b.
Substitution of a for c in AP2 gives a ^ b D a ^ av b ^ a, so by API, b # a follows from a ^ b. Symmetry of equality is obtained by contraposition. Thus the negation of an apartness relation is an equivalence relation. Let us denote by a the number O.a^as... of our mathematical colleague. From the proof that a = 0 leads to a contradiction, ~ a = 0 can be concluded. However, this proof does not give any lower bound for \a -0|; thus we have not concluded a / 0. Logically, the difference is one between ~~ a / 0 and a ± 0. The former says that it is impossible that a is equal to zero, the latter says that a positively is distinct from zero.
Classical logic contains the principle of indirect proof: If ~ A leads to a contradiction, A can be inferred. Axiomatically expressed, this principle is contained in the law of double negation, ~~ ADA. The law of excluded middle, A v ~ A, is a somewhat stronger way of expressing the same principle.
In constructive logic, the connectives and quantifiers obtain a meaning different from the one of classical logic in terms of absolute truth. The constructive "BHK meaning explanations" for propositional logic were given in Section 1.2, and those for quantifiers will be presented in Section 4.1. One particular feature in these explanations is that a direct proof of a disjunction consists of a proof of one of the disjuncts. However, the classical law of excluded middle Av ~ A cannot be proved in this way, as there is no method of proving any proposition or its negation. Under the constructive interpretation, the law of excluded middle is not an empty "tautology," but expresses the decidability of proposition A. Similarly, a direct proof of an existential proposition 3x A consists of a proof of A for some a. Classically, we can prove existence indirectly by assuming that there is no x such that A, then deriving a contradiction, and concluding that such an x exists. Here the classical law of double negation is used for deriving 3x A from ~~ 3x A.
More generally, the inference pattern, if something leads to a contradiction the contrary follows, is known as the principle of reductio ad absurdum. Dictionary definitions of this principle rarely make the distinction into a genuine indirect proof and a proof of a negative proposition: If A leads to a contradiction, then ~ A can be inferred. Mathematical and even logical literature are full of examples in which the latter inference, a special case of a constructive proof of an implication, is confused with a genuine reductio. A typical example is the proof of irrationality of a real number x: Assume that x is rational, derive a contradiction, and conclude that x is irrational. The fallacy in claiming that this is an indirect proof stems from not realizing that to be an irrational number is a negative property: There do not exist integers n, m such that x = n/m.
The effect of constructive reasoning on logic is captured by intuitionistic logic. From the point of view of classical logic, it is no limitation not to use the law of excluded middle, or the principle of indirect proof, for the following reason: Given a formula C, there is a translation giving a formula C* such that C and C* are classically equivalent and C* is intuitionistically derivable if C is classically derivable. For example, a disjunction can be translated by (A v #)* = ~ (~ A*& ~ B*). The translation gives an interpretation of classical logic in intuitionistic logic. Another intuitionistic interpretation will be given in Chapter 5: For propositional logic, if a formula C is classically derivable, the formula where P\,..., P n are the atoms of C, is intuitionistically derivable. By this translation, classical propositional logic can be interpreted intuitionistically as a logic in which the proofs of theorems are relativized to decisions on their atoms.
The method of interpreting classical logic in intuitionistic logic through a suitable translation applies to predicate logic and axiomatic theories formalizable in it, such as arithmetic. For such theories, constructive reasoning will only apparently decrease the deductive strength of the theory.
The essential difference between classical and constructive reasoning concerns predicativity: The idea, advocated by Poincare and by Russell, is that "anything involving a totality must not be defined in terms of that totality." Poincare wanted mathematical objects and structures to be generated from the rock bottom of natural numbers. In Russell, predicativity was a response to the set-theoretical paradoxes, particularly Russell's paradox that arises from defining a "set of all sets that are not members of themselves." In this impredicative definition, the totality of all sets is presupposed. Another traditional example of an impredicative definition is the definition of the set of real numbers through complete ordered fields. Impredicativity is met in second-order logic in which quantifiers range over propositions. With X, Y, Z . . . standing as variables for propositions, we can form second-order propositions such as (iX)X and (VX) ((A D (B D X) ) D X). Assertion of the first proposition means that for any proposition X, it is the case that X. Then (VX)X must be false in a consistent system, and falsity has a secondorder definition as _L = (WX)X. The rule of falsity elimination becomes a special case of universal instantiation,
The second example of a second-order proposition defines the proposition A&B, as can be seen by deriving the rules of conjunction introduction and elimination from the definition, using only the rules for implication and second-order universal quantification. Through the propositions-as-sets principle, we see that secondorder quantification amounts to quantification over sets.
INTUITIONISTIC SEQUENT CALCULUS
In this section, we present an intuitionistic sequent calculus with the remarkable property that all structural rules, weakening, contraction, and cut, are admissible in it. Classical sequent calculi are obtained by removing certain intuitionistic restrictions, and admissibility of structural rules carries over to the classical calculi, as shown in the next chapter. Other extensions of the basic calculus will be studied in later chapters. Sequents are of the form F =$• C, where F is a finite, possibly empty, multiset. The rules of the calculus G3ip for intuitionistic propositional logic are the following:
G3ip
Logical axiom: The axiom is restricted to atomic formulas. It is essential that _L is not considered an atomic formula, but a zero-place logical operation. Each rule has a context designated by F in the above rules, active formulas designated by A and B, and a principal formula that is introduced on the left or the right by the rule in question.
The above calculus differs in three respects from the sequent calculus rules presented in Section 1.3: Only atoms appear in axioms, and the formula A D B is repeated in the left premiss of the LD rule. The reason for the latter will become apparent later, when admissibility of contraction is proved. Third, the rules have shared contexts.
The calculus has been developed by Troelstra, as a single succedent variant of the calculus of Dragalin (1988). None of the usual structural rules of sequent calculus, weakening, contraction, and cut, need be assumed in it. Exchange rules are absent because of properties of multisets and the other structural rules; those of weakening, contraction, and cut will be proved admissible. The structural rules we consider are
In Gentzen's original calculus of 1934-35, the structural rules were first assumed, and then it was shown how to eliminate applications of the cut rule. A calculus for intuitionistic logic of the above type, with no structural rules, was first developed by Kleene in 1952 for the purpose of proof search. In Gentzen, negation is primitive, but this does not make a great difference. It has the simplifying effect that derivations begin with axioms only, not LJ_. Gentzen's calculus maintained the rule of weakening; therefore axioms were of the form A =^ A, with no context since it could be added by weakening. In the calculus G3ip, weakening is admissible because it is built into the axiom and the L_L rule. The logical rules of the calculus are intuitionistic versions of the rules of Ketonen (1944); In Gentzen's calculus, there were two left rules for conjunction, one for each premiss of the form A, F => C and B, F =>• C, and the conclusion as in the above rule. Further, the left implication rule was as follows:
There are two contexts that are joined in the conclusion, so that the rule has independent contexts. In the calculus G3ip, instead, all two-premiss logical rules are context-sharing, or have the same context. A shared context is needed for having a contraction-free calculus. Further, the principal formula in LD is repeated in the left premiss for the same purpose, a device invented by Kleene in 1952.
(He repeated the principal formula in all the left rules, but such repetition is needed only for noninvertible rules.)
PROOF METHODS FOR ADMISSIBILITY
Our task in the next two sections is to establish the admissibility of structural rules for the calculus G3ip. Proofs of admissibility will use induction on weight of formulas and height of derivations. Formula weight can be defined in different ways, depending on what is needed in a proof. For the next few chapters a simple definition, amounting to the length of a formula, will be sufficient. In Section 5.5, we shall encounter more complicated formula weights. Proof by induction on height of derivation is a usual method, often as a subinduction in an inductive proof on formula weight. In the following, the notation will stand for: the sequent F =>• C in G3ip is derivable with a height of derivation at most n.
Definition 2.3.1: The weight w(A) of a formula A is defined inductively by w(±) = 0, w(P) = I for atoms P, w(A o B) = w(A) + w(B) + I for conjunction, disjunction, and implication.

It follows that tu(~ A) = w(A) + tu(_L
When proving the admissibility of a rule by induction on height of derivation, we prove it for subderivations ending in a topmost occurrence of the rule in question, then generalize by induction on the number of applications of the rule to arbitrary derivations. Therefore it can be assumed that in a derivation there is only one instance of the rule in question, the last one. 
Proof:
The proof is by induction on height of derivation. If n = 0, then F =>• C is an axiom or conclusion of L_L and either C is an atom and a formula in F or _L is a formula in F. In either case, also D, F =>• C is an axiom or concluded by L_L. Assume now that height-preserving weakening is admissible up to derivations of height < ft, and let \-n+x F => C. If the last rule applied is L&, F = A&B, F' and the last step is A&B, r^c L& so the premiss A, B, F r => C is derivable in ^ ft steps. By inductive hypothesis, also D, A, 5 , F' =>• C is derivable in ^ ft steps. Then an application of L& gives a derivation of D, A&B, F =^C i n^f t + l steps. A similar argument applies to all the other logical rules. QED.
A more direct way of obtaining height-preserving weakening is to transform the given derivation by adding the weakening formula to the antecedents of all its sequents. Two-premiss rules of G3ip have the same context in both premisses, and the conclusion inherits only one copy of these. In the proof transformation showing admissibility of height-preserving weakening, the weakening formula is added always into the contexts of axioms or L_L, and therefore no multiplication of the weakening formula is produced. By repeating weakening, we find weakening admissible for an arbitrary context F':
For proving the admissibility of contraction, we will need the following inversion lemma: Lemma 2.3.5:
Proof: By induction on n.
(i) If A&B, F =>• C is an axiom or conclusion of L_L; then, A&5 not being atomic or J_, also A, 5 , F =>• C is an axiom or conclusion of L_L.
Assume height-preserving inversion up to height n, and let h n + i A&B, F =Ĉ .
If ASLB is the principal formula, the premiss A, B,F =} C has a derivation of height ft.
If ASLB is not principal in the last rule, it has one or two premisses A&B, F f => C\ A&B, F" =>• C", of derivation height ^ n; so by inductive hypothesis, \-n A, B, F f => C" and \-n A, B, F /r ^ C". Now apply the last rule to these premisses to conclude A, B, F =>> C in at most n + 1 steps.
( Let contraction be admissible up to derivation height n. We have two cases according to whether the contraction formula is not principal or is principal in the last inference step.
If the contraction formula D is not principal in the last (one-premiss) rule concluding the premiss of contraction we have Remarkably, the weaker result of admissibility of contraction without preservation of height is more difficult to prove than admissibility of height-preserving contraction, for its proof requires a double induction on formula weight with a subinduction on height of derivation.
The repetition of the principal formula in the first premiss of rule LD is needed in order to apply the inductive hypothesis that permits contraction in a derivation of less height. In classical sequent calculus with shared contexts, all rules are invertible and there is no need for such repetition. The same is true in G3ip in the sense that the rule without repetition,
A D B,V =^C is admissible in G3ip. This follows by the application of weakening with A D B to the left premiss F =>• A.
We now come to the main result of this chapter, the admissibility of cut for the calculus G3ip. Gentzen called his cut elimination theorem the "Hauptsatz," the main theorem, and this is how cut elimination is often called today also. The proof uses, explicitly or implicitly, all the preceding lemmas and theorems to show that cuts can be permuted upward in a derivation until they reach the axioms and conclusions of L_L the derivation started with. When both premisses of a cut are axioms or conclusions of L_L, the conclusion also is an axiom or conclusion of LJ_: If the first premiss is _L, F =^ C, the conclusion has _L in the antecedent, and if the first premiss is P, F =>• P, the second premiss is P, A =>• C. This is an axiom only if C = P or C is an atom in A, and it is a conclusion of L_L only if _L is in A. In each case, the conclusion of cut P, F, A =^ C is an axiom or conclusion of L_L. As a consequence, when cut has reached axioms and instances of L_L, the derivation can be transformed into one beginning with the conclusion of the cut, by just deleting the premisses.
The proof of admissibility of cut for G3ip is by induction on the weight of the cut formula and a subinduction on the sum of heights of derivations of the two premisses. This sum is called cut-height:
Definition 2.4.2: Cut-height. The cut-height of an instance of the rule of cut in a derivation is the sum of heights of derivation of the two premisses of cut.
We give transformations that always reduce the weight of cut formula or cutheight. Actually, what happens is that cut-height is reduced in all cases in which the cut formula is not principal in both premisses of cut. In the contrary case, cut is reduced to formulas of lesser weight. This process terminates since atoms can never be principal in logical rules.
Cut-height is not monotone as we go down in a derivation; that is, a cut below another one can have a lesser cut-height: In the derivation of one of its premisses there is the first cut, and this derivation has a greater height than either of the premisses of the first cut. But the other premiss may have a height much shorter than either premiss of the first cut, making the sum less than the sum in the first cut. It follows that the permutation of a cut upward does not always reduce cutheight but can increase it. For this reason, we shall explicitly calculate the height of each cut in what follows. As with weakening and contraction, we may assume that there is only one occurrence of the rule of cut, as the last step. Proof: The proof is organized as follows: We consider first the case that at least one premiss in a cut is an axiom or conclusion of L_L and show how cut is eliminated. For the rest there are three cases: 1. The cut formula is not principal in either premiss of cut. 2. The cut formula is principal in just one premiss of cut. 3. The cut formula is principal in both premisses of cut.
Cut with an axiom or conclusion of L_L as premiss: If at least one of the premisses of cut is an axiom or conclusion of LJ_, we distinguish two cases: 
1.2.
_L is a formula in F. Then F, A =>> C is a conclusion of L_L.
2.
The right premiss D, A =^ C is an axiom or conclusion of L_L. There are four subcases:
2.1. C is in A. Then F, A =^ C is an axiom.
C = D.
Then the first premiss is F => C and F, A =$• C follows by weakening. is transformed into the derivation with a cut of cut-height m + k:
_L is in
We observe that cut-height is reduced in each transformation. Note that cut-height can increase in the transformation, but the cut formula is reduced. This is transformed into the derivation with three cuts of heights n + 1 +m,n and max(n + 1, m) + 1 + max(n, k) + 1
D =
B B,A=>C T A^C
Cut
In the first and second cut, cut-height is reduced; in the second and third, weight of cut formula. QED.
In many of the permutations of cut upward in a derivation, the number of cuts increases exponentially.
In contrast to the logical rules, the contexts in the two premisses of the cut rule are independent. However, by the admissibility of structural rules, we can show that also the cut rule with a shared context, is admissible. To see this, first apply the usual cut rule to the two premisses to derive F, F, =>• C, then contract the duplication of F in its conclusion.
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF CUT ELIMINATION
(a) The subformula property: Since structural rules can be dispensed with in G3ip, we find by inspection of its rules of inference that no formulas disappear from derivations: Similarly, a connective that has once appeared in a derivation cannot disappear. From this it follows in particular that =>± is not derivable, i.e., the calculus is syntactically consistent. Theorem 2.5.2: If =^ A V B is derivable in G3ip, then =>Aor =^B is derivable.
Proof: Only right rules can conclude sequents with an empty antecedent so the last rule can only be R v. QED.
This theorem establishes the disjunction property of the calculus for intuitionistic propositional logic. That such a property should hold follows from the constructive meaning of disjunction as given in Section 2.1. The result can be strengthened into a disjunction property under suitable hypotheses: Proof by induction on the height of derivation in a system with no structural rules is remarkably simple compared with the original proof of the result in Harrop (1960).
(b) Hilbert-style systems: We show that, from G3ip, the more traditional Hilbertstyle axiomatic formulation of intuitionistic propositional logic follows. In a Hilbert-style system, formulas rather than sequents are derived, starting with instances of axioms and using in the propositional case only one rule of inference, modus ponens. The axioms are given schematically as
In Hilbert-style systems, substitution of formulas is done in the schematic axioms to obtain the top formulas of derivations. These systems are next to impossible to use for the actual derivation of formulas because of the difficulty of locating the substitution instances that are needed. A notorious example is the derivation of A D A by substitutions in axioms 8 and 9:
There seems to be very little relation between the simplicity of the conclusion and the complexity of its derivation. In order to translate derivations in the Hilbertstyle system into G3ip we shall write axiom schemes as sequents with empty antecedents and the rule of modus ponens as the sequent calculus rulê
=> B
We show that this translation of derivations in the Hilbert-style system gives derivations in G3ip:
Theorem 2.5.5: If formula C is derivable in the Hilbert-style system, then =>• C is derivable in G3ip.
Proof: In a derivation of C, each instance A of an axiom is replaced by a derivation of the sequent =>• A. All the axiom schemes as sequents with empty antecedents are easily derived in G3ip, and we show only the first two:
Each application of modus ponens in the derivation of C is replaced by its sequent calculus version. We note that a rule is admissibile in G3ip if it is derivable using also structural rules. The underivability of these sequents in intuitionistic logic is usually established by model-theoretical means. We show their underivability proof-theoretically by the elementary method of contraction-and cut-free derivability. We note that if a sequent is underivable for atomic formulas, such as =^P v^P , then the corresponding sequent =>A\/~ A with arbitrary formulas is also underivable. Whenever in a root-first proof search a premiss is found that is equal to some previous sequent, proof search on that branch is stopped. One says that a loop obtains in the search tree. Stopping the proof search is justified by the fact that a continuation from the repeated sequent succeeds if and only if a search from its first occurrence succeeds.
Theorem 2.5.6: The following sequents are not derivable in G3ip:
Proof: (i) Assume there is a derivation of =>• P V ~ P. By the disjunction property, either =^ P or =^~ P is derivable. No rule concludes =>• P for an atom P, and only RD concludes =^~ P , so by invertibility of RD, P =>• _L is derivable. But no rule concludes such a sequent.
(ii) For =^~P v ~~ P to be derivable, by proof of (i), =>• ~~ P must be derivable. Proceeding root-first, the last three steps must be
Since the left premiss of the uppermost instance of LD is equal to its conclusion, this proof search does not terminate. Therefore there is no derivation of =>• ~~ P.
(iii) With =>((P D Q) D P) D P , the last two steps must be
If we continue by RD we get
P,(P D Q)D P ^ P D Q P,P => Q -LD
but the right premiss is not derivable by any rule. If we apply LD instead we get
This proof search fails because the sequent P, P =>• 2 is not derivable. Therefore (e) Decidability of intuitionistic propositional logic: In the above examples, we were able to survey all possible derivations and found by various arguments that none turned out to be good. This depended essentially on having all derivations contraction-and cut-free.
Theorem 2.5.7: Derivability of a sequent T =^ C in the calculus G3ip is decidable.
Proof:
We generate all possible finite derivation trees with endsequent T => C and show them to be bounded in number. Starting with F =^ C, we write all instances of rules that conclude it, then do the same for all the premisses of the last step. All rules except LD reduce the sequent to be derived into ones with less weight, where the weight of a sequent is the sum of the weights of its formulas. If in a proof search we arrive at a sequent that does not reduce by any rule, then if it is not an axiom or conclusion of L_L, we terminate the proof search. If in a proof search we have two applications of LD that conclude the same sequent, we also terminate the proof search. Application of LD root-first can produce only a bounded number of different sequents as premisses. Therefore each proof search tree terminates. If there is one tree all leaves of which are axioms or conclusions of LJ_, the endsequent is derivable; if not, it is underivable. QED.
This algorithm of proof search is not very efficient, as one can see by trying, say, the disjunction property under negative hypothesis. There are sequent calculi for intuitionistic propositional logic that are much better in this respect. One such calculus will be studied in Section 5.5.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
Constructive real numbers and constructive analysis is treated in Bishop and Bridges (1985) . The two-volume book of Troelstra and van Dalen (1988) is an encyclopedia of metamathematical studies on constructive logic and formal systems of constructive mathematics. A discussion of predicativity, with references to original papers by Poincare and Russell, is found in Kleene (1952, p. 42). The same reference also discusses the background and development of intuitionism (ibid., p. 46).
The calculus G3ip is the propositional part of a single succedent version of Dragalin's (1988) calculus and is presented as such in Troelstra and Schwichtenberg (1996) . The proofs of admissibility of contraction and cut follow the method of Dragalin, with inversion lemmas and induction on height of derivation. The proof in Dragalin (1988) is an outline; a detailed presentation is given in Dyckhoff (1997).
